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Topic: The Trojan Horse of Asymmetric Warfare  (Read 2110 times)
Seneca
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« on: April 24, 2007, 10:47:27 PM »

"Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose."

- Bernard Brodie


With the advent of nuclear weapons and the corollary of nuclear war (which was either mis-analyzed by the game-theory enthusiasts like Dr. Kahn and the ‘mutually-assured destruction’ crowd), many civilian think tank warfare theorists believed that direct superpower confrontation had become too dangerous to contemplate.

That something as inane as resting on laurels of 1945 nuclear victory over Japan in the form of an adopted threat-deterrent against any future enemy of America, ought to be attributed to the weakness and failure of democratic leadership. Thus was born “limited war” in the national lexicon of strategic thinking when the Korean War broke out in 1950 and President Truman limited the war objectives and means in order to avoid nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union. Instead of pursuing the war to total victory, which would have been the correct course, the straw-hat-totting Truman, feeling outclassed by the enormity of challenge, opted to humiliate a good general, MacArthur, and then surrender half of Korea and 97% of China to the enemy. The Korean War began the change in the American concept of war away from total war, or what was called at the time “general war,” to a form of war that was more “civilized” and “less dangerous” in the minds of social scientists (or ‘social engineers’ busy deconstructing the American and European society for the sake of every inferior’s hatred of upright society and for the sake of greed).

The problem of limited war from an American national interest standpoint was that it assumed U.S. enemies would likewise be restrained in objectives and means. This fanciful social science assumption rested on the unproven belief that no foreign national leader in his right mind would dare oppose America, following its World War II victory, once U.S. willingness to fight was made clear.

This of course depended upon deterrence or perception of American power in what one analyst states is:

“Communication is, thus, the first requirement of deterrence. The second requirement is a
viable capability. One has to have the capacity to inflict some sort of measurable harm.
The third requirement is credibility: what the defender communicates about his capability must be seen as credible by others.” (Bennett)

That communication is unreliable as a component of war was painfully demonstrated during the Vietnam War when the Western communication networks, the Media, began to turn their propaganda in a deliberate way against the interests of what should have been their own country. However, the abstract intellect becomes homeless and ‘superior’ to every earth-bound value-consideration as soon as it hits a certain threshold of power – and in the Western case – this has been reached by the late 1960’s.

The advocates of limited war never came to grips with what would happen if a Soviet Cold War client state refused to “play” by limited war “rules” or did not buy the greatness of American power notion:

I.E. how and when would limited war be concluded when the communists were pursuing total war objectives and the U.S. was waging a war for limited objectives? Asymmetry formed.

In other words, the rising tide of Western Liberalism that has distorted all the problems of the World and that has always sought unlimited dictatorship over the Western society for the purpose of its destruction, wanted to bluff its way through the Cold War and high diplomacy that needed to accompany it – so that it can focus undistracted onto its main task (the one that the Warren Court devoted itself to) – the internal revolutionary decomposition of the traditional Western society. This sadly hasn’t changed to this day.

Anyhow, the Liberals armed with lust for power have adopted an asymmetry in war strategies long before the now infamous contemporary asymmetry on the so-called Global War on Terror (GWOT) battlefield occurred.

This disparity of total vs. limited war objectives first became apparent as the Korean War dragged on and President Truman’s administration could find no way to conclude the conflict. When President Eisenhower assumed the presidency from Truman in 1953, he quickly recognized the logical solution to the strategic conundrum was shifting U.S. war-fighting from limited to total war means, and he thereby ended the Korean War by communicating to the Communists his intention of escalating with nuclear weapons if the communists persisted in their total war objectives. Civilian limited war advocates should have seen the glaring fallacy of their theory at this point, but they didn’t. For his part, gen. Eisenhower did not believe that limited war could remain limited.

As a warrior who knew war first-hand, President Eisenhower opted for a historically-based defense doctrine of “Massive Retaliation,” which promised an all-out nuclear attack on the Soviet Union in the event of aggression. Throughout the better part of the 1950’s, Eisenhower’s national security strategy insured that there was no military superpower confrontation.

Because the last Conservative U.S. President Eisenhower had doubts that a “limited war” would remain such, his over-all national security policy, called the “New Look,” was based on the unstoppable nuclear striking power of Strategic Air Command. During this period of relative peace, Democrat political opponents and social-science civilian theorists were in constant chorus that the New Look Massive Retaliation was simply too risky for the country and the world. It was in fact too risky for them and they had no intention of risking their power-designs on the country by maintaining a Conservative foreign policy tool.

In spite of the Massive Retaliation doctrine’s success in preventing conflict between the U.S. and Soviet Union, in 1961 President Kennedy and his civilian social-science theorists rewrote the rules of war, conceiving and implementing a replacement doctrine they dubbed “Flexible Response” to counter client proxy warfare. It was at this point that America completely departed from the strategic thinking that had won World War II. The change in mindset was profound and disastrous (its full effects have not yet come to pass). The fundamental change in the U.S. approach to warfare now had at its essence the new approach that America would answer enemy aggression against its interests with only a limited force that was “proportional” to the threat, thus inculcating the institutional idea in the U.S. national security infrastructure that American military responses should only be gradually escalated according to the perceived seriousness of the crisis.

The operative concept based on a bluff was that an enemy would “receive the message” that the U.S. intended to act militarily to defend its interests, and therefore, would be deterred from escalating the crisis further (i.e. the strategic bluff would work). Then, after it was clear to the enemy that his limited war objectives could not be attained, negotiations would ensue that would end the crisis. “Message sending” to the enemy through gradual escalation became an integral part of U.S. national security thinking and strategy.

And yet there was nothing planned in the event that an enemy calls the bluff (as North Vietnam did).

The Flexible Response doctrine did not contemplate that the North Vietnamese would “bear any burden, pay any price” to plant Vietnamese nationalist communism in the south of the former French colony. The obvious queries - why Kennedy’s brain-trust thought that only the U.S. was capable of complete dedication to a political concept or military strategy and how this group of men failed to address how an armed test of wills between two completely asymmetrically committed opponents would finally be resolved - both call into question the Kennedy circle’s basic rationality and the quality and integrity of their thought. Overall, JFK was a poor president and to his ‘martyrdom’ is owed this Media-generated aura about him.

Indeed, what it really suggests is a presumptuous mind-set that believed that the whole of mankind operated under the same set of values it does (the same mindset that dictates the best option for Iraq on the basis of what is ‘best’ for the West – i.e. the political system of ‘democracy’). America’s pervasive lack of appreciation and understanding of History is destroying its interests, long-term. It is hard to find any analyst anywhere who really thinks in historic terms.

It seems that all History begins with 1776 and the age of Western revolutions (for Marxists – all really important History began with them) and the rest is merely a field of testing of revolutionary theories.
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